This paper looks at ways of providing Quality of Service to users based on a simple pricing scheme. It is primarily aimed at elastic tra c, and it is users rather than the network who de ne the ow control schemes. A framework for assesing schemes and algorithms via a distributed game is presented.
Introduction
In telecommunication networks, the traditional approach to Quality of Service QoS requires users to tightly specify or control their tra c in return for tight QoS guarantees, while the network provider turns away excess demand. The Internet o ers the other extreme of accepting every demand, giving a vanilla`best e ort' QoS and relying on users behaving`nicely' to ensure`fairness'. Neither of these approaches is ideal, and both communities are struggling to de ne usable mechanisms for providing di erential QoS.
Might it not be possible to learn from some other areas where pricing and tari s are used extensively both to in uence user behaviour and to protect the resources? We claim that it is, and moreover that a rich set of behaviours and optimisations can beconstructed from the simplest of frameworks, rich enough to meet the needs of any user or application. Our only proviso is that we deal with demands that can react or adapt to some signal given by a resource. We show how to construct this simplest of models, and then describe how playing a sequence of distributed games could test the assertion. One of our intentions is to try to synthesise insights from di erent disciplines and also to encourage practitioners to design strategies that can betested in this environment.
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Our starting point is the work of Kelly, who in a series of papers elucidated some of the linkage between congestion controls and pricing in networks eg 1 , and the experimental work of Gibbens and Kelly 2 . Other approaches can be found in Odlyzko 3 or the congestion pricing work of MacKie-Mason and Varian 4 .
Framework
Our underlying model is a set of users R indexed by r think of r indexing a route who place demands x r on a set of resources, where the set of resources J is indexed by j. Resource j can have a n umberofmulti-dimensional attributes such as a capacity C j or a queueing discipline and bu er-size B j . If the resources are connected via a network then a route identi es a set of resources with an implicit ordering of resources. For xed routing, if the matrix A = A j r denotes the amount of resource consumed at resource j by user r then the o ered load to the resource vector C is Ax. For convenience assume that A is a matrix of ones or zeros.
The vector x can be interpreted as a vector of ows, with x r an amount of bandwidth or bandwidth per unit time. Now suppose each user has a utility function U r x r relating bandwidth to`worth', which we assume is concave, and hence characterises elastic tra c, Shenker 5 . For resources with nite capacity and utility functions which are additive across users, the`Social Optimum' which maximises P r U r x r for concave utility functions will, in general, accept as many users as possible, sharing out resources and dividing them ever more nely. If there is some cost function associated with the loading y on a resource, C j y s a y, which is increasing and di erentiable and measures the rate at which costs are incurred, then the`social planner' seeks to maximise Ux = P r U r x r , ; for Y Poisson or Gaussian, the shadow price derivative of C w.r.t y can beshown to beP sat = P fY Cg, the probability of resource saturation. Hence the marking scheme for an unbu ered resource is very simple: mark all those packets contributing to the load when the resource is overloaded, otherwise mark none. Note that the probability of loss, P loss = E Y , C + =E Y i s t ypically an order of magnitude less than P sat , so many more packets are marked than are lost.
With the identi cation U r x = w r log x, the social optimum is a Nash arbitration scheme and`proportionally fair' 1 , with w r = x r P j2r j , and hence we take the feedback signals to be of the form f r t = x r t X j2r j t: 6 
A class of Control Schemes
The choice of what is considered`optimal', even from a system viewpoint, is heavily in uenced by users' utility functions. However these are usually unknown to the network or system and perhaps even to the user, which suggests the following: let the network determine the prices, and let the users respond and place demands upon the network which the network will try to meet. The users are then free to behave as they wish, possibly implicitly performing some user optimisation. This certainly provides a rich class of behaviours, and the question we seek to answer is whether or not this is su cient, and whether it is possible to run a network in this manner. The network will generate revenues, which are related to congestion, and if all of the congestion revenues are reinvested in new capacity, then capacity will be expanded to the point where its marginal value is equal to its marginal cost. In other words the prices send back the correct signals for capacity expansion. The term`price' is suggestive of a monetary transaction, but it need not involve money. Indeed, even in the case of exchange of money, the actual charging mechanism is separate from the pricing signals, and could involve pre-purchase of credits
Rede ning Flow Control Algorithms
To implement these types of Flow Control Algorithms all that is needed is a means of feeding back information to the user. The signal is just a`mark' associated with each packet. Where there are a number of resources, packets could potentially be`marked' at each resource, thus the mark would be a non-negative integer. However in a stochastic network setting, if the network is running in a`sensible' region, then the probability of a packet being marked at more than one resource is small, hence the`mark' can be approximated by just one bit. Given that many data transfer protocols have a mechanism for Congestion Indication CI, then clearly we could t Explicit Congestion Noti cation, FECN or BECN into this scheme. With more advanced protocols such as ATM, the marked scheme ts in easily into the ABR tra c class using binary feedback. As an aside, note that for unbu ered resources, the shadow prices are just the probability of resource saturation, which will be approximately additive along a route provided that the resources are lightly loaded | another reason for wanting to run in aǹ uncongested' region.
As a speci c example, let us see how a`TCP-like' algorithm could be constructed. To implement a suite of rate control algorithms requires certain changes to the usual TCP algorithm 6 :
Add a marked packets variable, mpkt to the per-connection state. This is an integer counter of the number of marked packets received by the sender. The receipt of a non-zero mkpt may cause a recalculation of the congestion window cwnd `may' since the updating might be done periodically, rather than at every change of state variable. There is no explicit slow-start mode. The cwnd at start or after a lost packet is determined by the congestion algorithm | so does not have to default to 1. On receipt of an ACK, the cwnd is updated according to the congestion algorithm, which can use information from the mkpt state. In otherwords, the Congestion Avoidance phase is altered, as is Slow Start. Both are replaced by application speci c increases.
The slow-start threshold, ssthresh is retained for compatibility, but there is no requirement to use it.
A TCP-like example
Gibbens and Kelly have l o o k ed at the following class of algorithms, where we are working in discrete time for convenience.
Willingness to pay scheme' Flow control scheme with parameters and w x t+1 = x t + w , f t 7 where w represents a`willingness to pay', and a ects the rate of convergence of the algorithm.
The case w = 1 could beconsidered an`improvement' to TCP, or we could consider TCP-like' algorithm x t+1 = x t + w , f t x t 2 8 which replaces the`lost packet' signal by the feedback signal, but then reacts in the same way as TCP has f t x t and f t = x t Pf P X Cg = x t P sat for a single unbu ered resource instead of f t = x t P loss which is TCP.
These algorithms are implicitly related to a logarithmic utility function, or a proportionally fair scheme. It is worth noting what happens as we scale by the number or sources. With strictly concave utility functions, the overall return from the network depends on the numberof users | the more users or routes, the greater the return, hence the shadow price also depends on the number of users. Only if the utility functions are linear is independence of the numberof users achieved. For the rst scheme, from equation 7 the equilibrium value is achieved when w = E f t 9
hence it is not possible to design a scheme with w xed that gives the same network performance independent of the numberof users. This illustrates some of the di culties posed by trying to de ne an`optimal' ow control scheme and mandating everyone to use it. As w vary, the target performance varies. The following gures illustrate the e ect of varying w and the number of connections n when the capacity is 100, using a stochastic model. Figure 1 has w = 1, and shows how the overall load increases above capacity as the number of sources rises, giving an incentive to increase capacity. Figure 2 has w = 0:05 and the load increase is much more gradual in the steady state 0:05 = xPfnx Cg with a strong incentive for the users to keep the network lightly loaded. These gures can becontrasted with those for TCP, using the same set-up of single resource of capacity 100. From the discussion around equation 8 it follows that the steady-state behaviour of a discrete-time TCP algorithm is just
This is in units of segment size, hence if R is the round trip time, dividing by R gives the throughput, which is of the form c R p P loss 11 for some constant c, as others have found 7 . Figure 3 shows how the o ered load increases dramatically with the number of users, caused by too few feedback messages being generated. Changing the feedback signal to the shadow-price 
A Distributed Game as an Experimental Framework
How do we decided if it is possible to provide a rich-enough class of Qualities of Service to the users? One way would be to extensively simulate, however why not run a distributed emulation of a network, where users are free to invent their own algorithms or behave as they wish on a`network'? But this is exactly like a distributed multi-user game, where each user is trying to optimise their owǹ objective'. The advantage of this approach is that it both generates a mix of loads likely to beencountered in a real heterogeneous network, and also encourages users to develop`optimal' algorithms and strategies, much as happened in Axelrod's repeated Prisoners Dilemma experiments 8 . Gibbens and Kelly 2 have tried out initial set of experiments with di erent algorithms 1 , which require algorithms to beimplemented in Java. We propose a more general framework, where Users`play' against a`Network' which represents a resource system:
The game will comprise a distributed set of users, and a`Network', where the Network will initially be emulated on a PC or cluster of PCs at a single site.
A protocol interfaces between the users and the Network. Users will be able to interact connect across the Internet. Users are free to interact in real time, or via applications or programs. These can bein any language. Translation stubs between users' programs and the game protocol will be provided for certain common languages eg C, Java. Game Time can beslowed down or speeded up compared with real time.
Protocol for a distributed Game
The distributed game is between di erent users, or between a User and the Network. Hence it is necessary to design a protocol allowing users to communicate with the Network. Users generate load packets, which are sent to the Network that generates a set of marks. A more general framework allows a user to connect to a destination, or set of destinations, the Network then decides which resources the user is allocated, and sends back marks to the user based on state of the resources. Note that the feedback signals will depend upon what resource model the`Network' is using. The Network sends a signal to the user when the game starts and ends, and sends information about the relative speed of the game compared to slots or real time which enables users playing in real time via Telnet to compete with compiled programs. Timing information is sent back to the user via a heartbeat.
The basic game protocol is text based, sits above TCP, and consists of just three parts: packet : pkt = destination token size where destination , token and size are all unsigned single wordlength. The token is generated by the user, and used to enable users to detect loss. size is interpreted as an integer, destination is used to identify a`route' in the game Network.
ACK : ACK = token mark where token can be void or corrupted, and mark is in general an integer giving a numberof marks on the packet. Note that the receiving and generating of packets, ACKS and time do not have t o follow that sequence | a numberof packets can begenerated before any ACKs are received and time messages will be received asynchronously.
Objectives, Algorithms and Analysis
It is interesting to note that the analysis of this class of control schemes can be looked at from the following disciplines amongst others!:
Computer science: for instance the exploration of the implementation of algorithms and protocols.
Control Theory: the algorithms themselves fall into stochastic control theory.
Game Theory: although the real system has a lot of inherent`noise', it is possible to pose certain abstractions as well-posed games, both co-operative and non co-operative.
Economics: exploring the relationship between prices and optimality.
Financial mathematics: by viewing the network as a`smart-market' with prices re ecting valuation of assets, nancial derivatives relate to questions of reservation.
Stochastic Decision Theory.
Evolutionary Biology.
Optimisation Dynamic Programming.
The speci cation of an`optimal' algorithm is critically dependent upon what criterion is used to determine optimality. Here we explore optimality from the users' perspective, where loosely the aim is to maximise information transfer at minimum cost. We shall use the general framework given above, where a user has some utility associated with bandwidth, and costs are incurred, where costs are proportional to the number of packets marked. If x r t is the load rate generated at time t by user r, and the numberof packets marked is f r t, with cost factor , then cost is incurred at rate f t t. In the following we drop the dependence of x and f on r for clarity, and where there is no confusion write x t instead of x r t etc. The objectives are shown in discrete time with the obvious extension to continuous time. Typical objectives might b e :
1. Control Costs The simplest objective w ould be to keep the expected rate of cost constant | if this is w, which Kelly terms a`willingness to pay', then in terms of Decision theory, the objective is Minimise L w , f t 12 for some loss function L. If the user is attempting to chose w perhaps via some proxy function, then with the quadratic loss function Lx = x 2 this is minimised when w = E f t , which is an alternative interpretation of the`elastic scheme' described earlier. Note that some of these are not necessarily well posed eg the Quick File Transfer, but that all of them are`nice'. However this need not be the case. For instance a user could choose to do as much damage as possible to other users at minimum cost, which is a situation the network has to cope with, and is a valid objective in this sense.
A Sequence of Games
Initially it is sensible to look at a single objective, and have a tournament or competition based on this. For various reasons, the`Fixed Time File Transfer' is a sensible starting point, as it is amenable to analysis. Goodalgorithms will compete against clones of themselves, and against users trying to achieve the same objective. The Network will have to provide some background load.
The next two stages are to use a de ned heterogeneous environment, where the population of types of users is xed, at least in probability, and nally the completely heterogeneous case, where users compete against each other and try to maximise their own objectives. The latter case emulates a real network where it is also important to study the robustness of goodalgorithms `genotypes' as the population or environment e v olves.
Conclusions and Further Work
We h a ve argued that it is possible to provide di erential quality of service to users by means of simple pricing scheme, where the network sends back the correct congestion prices to the user, and the users are then free to choose how to react.
We have presented a framework for assessing the e ectiveness and stability of ow control schemes by constructing a distributed game, played with users against a`Network' where the Network provides the environment ecosystem. The protocols and mechanisms to play the game are currently being constructed, and will also be available for download 2 .
Then the`games' will begin!
